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The history of energy utilization constitutes an important part of 
the history of economy, society and culture. One of its most important 
aspects is the transformation of motive power, which is closely as­
sociated with improvements in production machinery, and has contributed 
to the rapid development of manufacturing industries. This was the case 
in the so-called industrial revolution which began with improvements in 
spinning machinery during the 1960s in 'England. 
2 Waterframe spinning 
machinery invented by Richard Arkwright (1766) led to substitution of 
water power for human power. The further development of spinning mach~ 
inery demanded new engines, powerful and independent of water streams. 
This demand was met by the appearance of the steam engine. 
Improvements by James Watt during the 1770s and following decade 
permitted steam engines to be used for the first time for industrial 
purposes. Because of subsequent increases in speed and decreases in price, 
steam engines began to be employed to a greater extent in industry, notably 
in spinning factories equipped with waterframes and mules. Steam engines 
were continuously improved in response to various demands: large capacity, 
low fuel consumption, high speed, small size and light weight, etc. During 
the late nineteenth century, however, these technical improvements reached a 
2 
plateau. Steam engines were gradually replaced by steam turbines having 
large capacity and high speeds, and internal combustion engines, small in 
size and light in weight. Furthermore, electric motors began to be used in 
a wide range of factories after the invention of the alternating current 
motor (1885-90) and eventually displaced the steam engine. This transforma­
tion from steam engines to electric motors-- electrification-was 
really the most sweeping and complex technological chang~ in manufacturing 
industries. 
This paper aims at a quantitative study of electrification and its 
impact on smaller scale manufacturers in Japan. Emphasis is placed on the 
smaller plants because of the economic significance of electrification to 
them. By way of introduction, however, we will discuss the whole motive 
power transformation process including electrification in larger manufactur­
ing plants. In the first section the process of transformation will be sur­
veyed for the manufacturing sector as a whole and then by the scale of plants 
in this sector. In the last part of the section factors responsible for 
electrification will be reviewed. A section is devoted to an examination 
of the impact of electrification on smaller plants. The hypothesis that 
persistent growth of these plants was dependent largely on the introduction 
of motive power through electrification will be tested. That is, the 
relationship between electrification and the introduction of motive power is 
examined and the effects of motive power on productivity increases will be 
clarified for two industries, match making and weaving, as examples typical 
of smaller scale factories. Finally, conclusions from the first two 
sections will be summarized and their implications discussed. Further, 
3 
I 
another form of electrification, the use of electric lighting, and its 
significance will be taken up. 
The how and why of electrification in manufacturing industries 
A Electrification in manufacturing industries 
Prior to the age of electric motors, water wheels and steam engines 
were used by Japanese manufacturers. Water wheels were dominant from the 
end of the Tokugawa era until about 1890 in industries such as silk reel­
ing and cotton spinning (Kanbayashi 1948, p. 63). Yamaguchi's compilation 
(1956, p. 96) from the Prefectural Statistical Tables (Fuken Tokei-hyo) 
shows that around 1884, 47.3 percent of factories were equipped with water 
wheels whereas only 3.6 percent had steam engines, 44.2 percent had no 
motive power, and 4.9% were unaccounted for. 
The introduction of steam engines dates from the 1860s (Kanbayashi 
1948, pp. 75-76). In 1861 the Nagasaki Iron Mill began to use steam power. 
Shimazu Hisamitsu of the Satsuma clan, who imported cotton spinning machinery 
from England in 1866, completed a spinning plant equipped with a steam engine 
the next year. In 1871, the Tomioka Silk Reeling Plant, a government enter­
prise, began to operate steam powered machinery imported from France. The 
Takashima Colliery Company ran shaft transporters powered by a steam engine. 
Thereafter steam engines diffused rapidly, especially in the 1890s •.Yamaguchi's 
statistics (1956, p. 111) show factories equipped with water wheels decreased 
to 19.9 percent around 1892, whereas factories using steam power increased 
to 25.3 percent. A rapid rise in steam power since 1884 can be seen in 
Figure 1, which shows horsepower of prime movers by type. Horsepower sup­
plied by steam engines (including steam turbines), shown in Figure 2, already 
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exceeded 85 percent in 1889. In contrast, water wheels (hydro turbines, 
Pelton, and Japanese-type) continuously decreased, amounting to less than 
10 percent at the turn of the century. 
During the phase of steam power diffusion, introduction of techniques 
for generating, transmitting and using electric light and power was already 
in progress. 3 The first actual use of electric light in Japan was at 
the Sangenya Plant of the Osaka Spinning Company in 1886, from electricity 
generated within the plant. The supply of electric lighting for public use 
was begun by the Tokyo Electric Light Company in 1887. In both cases power 
was obtained by thermal generation. Hydro generation dates from 1890. In 
this year two companies, the Shimotsuke Jute Yarn Spinning and the Ashia 
Copper Mine, connnenced hydroelectric generation for their own use~ In 1892 
Kyoto City set up a water plant, the Keage Power Plant, and began to supply 
electricity for public use. Thereafter, numerous hydro plants were estab­
lished in various regions and a remarkable rise in generating capacity 
occurred. 
Statistics for generating capacity are available from 1903, and for 
electricity generated and consumed, from 1907. They are given in Table 1, 
columns (2), (3) and (4), respectively, for every fifth year. The number 
of electric bulbs installed, shown-in column (1), suggests use spread 
rapidly after 1890. 
During the late 19th century and the beginning of this century, 
electric power generation by firms for their own use was much greater 
than that by electric utilities. Statistics for 1907 show the latter was 
only 39 percent of total power generated. However, owing to a rapid increase 
5 
in output by utilities. This increased to over 50 percent in 1913. The. 
predominance of the utilities was made possible by their rapid progress 
in transmission techniques. A representative example is the completion of 
a power transmission line by the Tokyo Electric·Light Company in 1914, 
which enabled the long distance (228 kilometers, third longest line in the world at 
that time) and high voltage (115,000 volt)tr~nsmission of 37,500 kilowatts 
from the Inawashiro Hydro Plant to the.Tokyo district. 
In the course of the development of electric generation, electric 
motors came to be widely used. Figure 1 shows horsepower of electric 
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motors increased remarkably after 1899. In 1905 it exceeded the horse­
power of water wheels and in 1917 it exceeded that of steam engines. 
Figure 2 shows a rapid decrease in the percentage of steam power, which 
signifies a sweeping substitution of electric power for steam. The rela­
tive decrease in steam power and the increase in electric power, however, 
stopped around 1930, implying electrification in factories was actually 
completed aroundthat time. 
In summary, the substitution of steam engines for water wheels took 
place in 1890-1905. The substitution of electric motors for steam engines, 
beginning in the 1890s, occurred from 1905 to 1930. It appears that these 
two substitutions occurred in a much shorter time than was the case in the 
other industrialized countries. 
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B Examination by scale of factory 
Power statistics by scale of factory are available from the Kojo
-Tokei-hyo- beginning with 1909, though on an annual basis only from 1930. 
From these data,.percentages of various prime movers in terms of horse 
are calculated and shown by scale of factory for six years from 1909 
to 1940 in Table 2. In 1909 steam engines constituted about half of 
available horsepower in even the smallest plants, increasing to four-
fifths for those with more than 500 production workers. The share of 
water wheels was somewhat greater for smaller firms. -However the data 
for water wheel usage by large firms are so erratic for··· 1909-19 that 
problems of sampling and reporting may be significant. Plants with over 1000 
workers relied relatively somewhat more on electric motors, but up to that 
level there was no significant scale pattern. 
By 1930 composition of prime movers by type and by scale of establish­
ment had changed substantially. The percentages of water wheels and of 
steam engines decreased sharply from 1909 to 1930. By 1930 the share of 
water wheels was almost zero in all scales except the smallest. Steam 
engines amounted to only 4-14 percent in the under 999 group and 19 percent 
for plants over 100 persons. The percentage of electric motors (S) in­
creased rapidly in all scales, reaching 80 to 95 percent in 1930. That is, 
the completion of electrification at all scales had occurred by around 1930. 
Another index of electrification, y,the percentage of electric motors to 
total prime movers, is calculated in Table 3 by scale of plant for the 
same six years. 5 Electric motors were only one-fifth of total prime movers 
on average in 1909, less for smaller plants and substantially greater for 
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large factories; by 1930 electric motors were the predominant prime mover 
in all factories. With this index the more rapid electrification in the 
smaller plants and the completion of electrification around 1930 in all 
scales can be observed again. 6 And, as is discussed later (see Table 8) 
the percentage of factories with prime movers, always high for the largest 
scale factories, increased from low to high rates for small factories as 
W€!ll. 
c: Reasons for Electrification 
The major factors responsible for the rapid substitution of electric 
power for steam power were the advantages electric motors have over steam 
engines and developments in the electric utilities and electric machine 
industry. 
Merits of Electric Motors. Electric motors differ from steam engines 
in ease of operation and efficiency of small units of operation. Table 4, 
Panels A and B show average capacity (horsepower) ot prime movers by type: i.e., 
electric motors, steam engines, steam turbines, gas engines, petrol engines and 
water wheels. Panel A gives figures for all scales of factories by year, 
and shows all other engines with the exception of petrol engines had 
greater average capacity than electric motors. The average capacity of 
steam turbines increased remarkably, to 3900 horsepower in 1940. Panel 
B gives figures by scale of factory for 1940, and indicates little dif-
ference in the average capacity among scales in the case of electric 
motors, whereas in the other engines, for example steam engines and turbines, 
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an increasing trend can be seen in the average capacity as scale increases. 
The significance of introducing small capacity electric motors into 
smaller factories and into larger ones will be considered separately. 
Because small.plants could not be equipped with large capacity steam 
engines, tools and machinery continued to be operated by human power for 
a long time. The appearance of electric power had a revolutionary effect 
on these plants by enabling the replacement of human power, in many cases 
mereJ._y by extending a electric wire to an ordinary house and installing one 
small electric motor within the house (Hoshino 1956, p. 181). On the other 
hand, in larger plants, a comparison of economic efficiency between steam 
engines and electric motors was crucial. 
The use of steam power necessitated group drive arrangements, where 
power of one or more steam engines was transmitted to machinery by means of 
big shafts and long belts. The introduction of electric motors gave rise to 
unit drive arrangements, where electric motors directly operated each tool 
and machine. This new system has many merits. One was greater flexibility 
of factory layout and design because the limitations entailed by big shafts 
were eliminated. Capital cost was reduced through reductions in floor space 
and in building construction; heavy, multistoried structures with reinforced 
floors capable of supporting reciprocating steam engines were not needed. Loss 
of e·nergy was reduced because individual parts of the production process could 
be stopped independently. 7 This system was widely introduced in various 
industries during World War I and after, when small induction motors began 
to be produced in Japan. In the spinning industry, for example, the unit 
. 8drive system was employed extensively from about 1932. In two 
9 
plants constructed in that year, the Inami Plant of the Kureha Spinning 
Company and the Sasazu Plant of the Tenman Weaving Company, all processes 
through spinning utilized unit drive arrangements. In the Sekigahara Plant 
of the Dai Nippon Spinning Company, completed in 1934, the new arrange­
ments were introduced in all processes (Moriya 1948, p. 181). 
Development of electric utilities and the electric machine industry. 
~ithout cheap electric motors, rapid introduction of electric power 
would not necessarily have been the case, even_ though electric motors were 
advantageous compared with other prime movers. Electrification was also 
dependent upon development of both electric utilities and the electric 
machine industry. 
Electric utilities. Prior to 1932 electric light and power rates were not 
under government control but were determined by generating costs and supply-demand 
conditions. Table 5, columns (1) and (2) show _the average rates of elec-
tric light and power, respectively.-$ During 1907-15 the average rate 
for electric light (used mainly for household consumption) showed a de-
crease, whereas that for power (used mainly for industrial purposes) showed 
an increase. The increase in power rates is a superficial trend resulting 
from statistical and methodological problems in estimation. In reality, 
the rate for electric power also seems to have declined during this period. 10 
This was the result of a decrease in generating costs coming from the in­
troduction of hydro generation and, after the Russo-Japanese War, the success 
of high voltage transmission. In 1908 the Tokyo Electric Light Company cut 
10 
light and power rates by 12 percent and 22 percent, respectively, because 
of a sharp drop in generating costs due to the completion of the Komabashi 
Power Plant in 1907 (Nitta 1936, pp. 99-100). Aggressive competition among 
utilities accelerated this declining trend. In Tokyo, for instance, over­
lapping supply of light and power began around _1907 among three sources: the 
Tokyo Electric Light Company, Tokyo City government, and the Tokyo Electric 
Railway Company (Arisawa 1960, 3:114). 
The ·Tokyo Electric Light Company reduced rates when the Yatsuzawa Power 
Plant started to operate in 1912.(Nitta 1936, p. 107). After a trough in 1915 
(at which time the average electric power rate was 30 yen per 1000 KWH), rates 
began to rise because of a big increase in demand caused by the economic boom 
during and after World War I. The upward trend during these inflation 
years (1915-19) was much larger for the power rate than for the lighting 
rate. Because of this, as shown in Table 6, the ratio of the electric 
power rate to the manufacturing output price index (column (2)) was almost 
constant, whereas the ratio of the lighting rate to the consumer price index 
(column (1)) decreased for 1915-20. 
During the recession years after the war boom the lighting and power 
rates showed different patterns of change. The lighting rate continued to 
rise during this period. It was 72 yen in 1920 and 99 yen in 1930 per 
1000 KWH. Consequently the ratio of this rate to the consumer price index 
increased. On the other hand the power rate began to decline from a peak 
in 1923 (69 yen per 1000 KWH) and returned to the 1916 level in 1932. 
This decline was caused by aggressive price cutting among electric util­
ities resulting from excess supply. 11 
There were two reasons for this over-supply. The first is a technical 
one: hydro plants at that time did not have dams and thus could not control 
11 
seasonal variations in water flows. Consequently, the need to have 
sufficient generation capacity to meet peak loads in periods of;water 
shortage necessarily gave rise to over-supply under normal conditions. 
The second reason is a decrease in the growth .of the demand for industrial 
use during the depression of the 1920s and early 30s. The low 
prices resulting from over-supply of electric power, however, created new 
sources of demand: smaller factories in manufacturing and electro-chemi­
cal industries such as annnonium sulphate and electrolysis.12 The appear­
ance of these new users lessened the financial difficulties of the electric 
utilities (Fujino 1965, pp. 444-449; Kurihara 1964, pp. 256-261). 
Differences in changes between the lighting rate and the power rate 
are explained by differences in their price elasticities of demand. Elec­
tric lighting consumption, with a much lower elasticity, does not decrease 
much in response to a rise in its rate. This is not the case for the more 
elastic electric power consumption. Therefore the utilities intended to 
stimulate demand for electric power by reducing its price while increasing 
the lighting rate to compensate for the lower profits from power ·rates. 
In this way a large difference between the two rates appeared in this 
particular period. 13 
Since 1932, the year the electric power cartei was established, rates 
have been under government control. Owing to this control, rates for 
electric light and power could not increase rapidly compared with other 
price indexes: The ratio in column (1) of Table 6 decreased from 1935 to 
1938 and the ratio in column (2) declined from 1930 to 1940. 
As for substitution of electric power for steam, changes in the price of 
14coal must also be considered. The coal price index in Table 5, column 
12 
(3) shows a sharp increase after 1915. Consequently, the ratio of the 
electric power rate to the coal price, shown in Table 7, column (1) 
began to decline remarkably in the early 1920s. One of the basic causes 
of this decline seems to be that technological progress was much faster in 
the electric utilities than in coal mining: relative labor productivity 
calculated in Table 7, column (2) shows an increasing trend for the entire 
period. In short, the difference in the rate of technological progress 
between electric utilities and coal mining accelerated the substitution of 
electric power for steam power.15 
Electric Machine Industry. A wide range of electric. machinery and ap­
pliances was imported, mainly from the United States, in the Meiji era. The• 
Miyoshi Electric Plant, the first manufacturer of electric machinery, began 
to operate in 1884. In the 1890s the Ishikawajima Shipbuilding Yard, the 
Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company and others appeared. Production techniques 
in these plants were, however, poor, and products were merely an imitation 
of the imports (Arisawa 1960, 6:17). Furthermore, technological progress was 
too slow to keep pace with the rapid development in the electric utilities. 
They produced mainly small capacity, low- voltage machinery. With an increase 
in demand for electric machinery, the number of manufacturers increased from 
the late Meiji period. Because of progress in production techniques and the 
interruption of imports during World War I, production of previously imported 
large capacity, high voltage machinery began in the mid-Taisho period. By 
the early 1930s, demand was almost entirely met domestically (Hitachi 1949, 
vol. 1 and 1960, ch. 1). In·this process borrowed technology was predominant. 
This is easily understood since almost all the major electric manufacturers 
- -
13 
16had technological tie-ups with foreign manufacturers. 
This was the case for production of electric motors. The first domestic­
ally produced motor was a 25 horsepower two-phase induction motor manufactured 
by Tokyo Shibaura in 1895 (Meiji 1928, p. 401). Thereafter production was 
carried on by several manufacturers mainly for small capacity motors. Mass 
production of standard type small capacity motors began in 1918 when Hitachi 
began to produce this type of motor at its Kameido Plant. A history of this 
17 company tells us this caused the price to go down and quality to improve. 
Figure 3 shows a sharp decline in the price of elect~~c motors of one horse­
power after 1920. This decline seems to have made electric power more acces­
sible to smaller plants. (see Ch~sho 1960, p. 21). 
II Impact on smaller scale plan4s of introducing electric power 
A Electrification and introduction of motive power 
The impact of the introduction of electric power on the growth of smaller 
enterprises deserves special attention, because the introduction of motive 
power occurred .directly with electric motors. This change seems to have con­
tributed to a rise in labor productivity. 
According to a series based on the Noshomu Tokei-hyo for establishments 
with ten or.more production workers, only about 30 percent of factories were 
equipped with prime movers at the end of the nineteenth century. This 
increased steadily thereafter and reached 70 percent in 1918. Table 8 shows 
the ratio (a) of factories equipped with prime movers to total factories 
for all scales of manufacturing factories as a whole, based on data from 
Kojo Tokei-hyo for establishments with five or more persons. This ratio 
rose from 28 percent in 1909 to 93 percent in 1930. That is to 
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say, the introduction of power was almost completed by the latter year. 
In comparison with Table 2 and Figure 2, one may see the introduction 
of power during the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth was accomplished mainly by the installation of steam power, 
whereas the introduction of power thereafter C?me from the utilization of 
electric motors. 
Let us now elaborate upon the relationship between power introduction 
and the electrification by scale of factory. The percentage by scale of 
powered factories a appear in Table 8 and of electric motors f3 (in horse-
power) and y (in numbers) in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
18 
Figure 4 depicts 
changes over time in the percentages a, f3 and y for factories employing 
5-9 persons and for 1000 persons or more. For the very small plants 
a, f3 and y show conspicuously increasing trends for 1909-30. However, a 
was already 100 for the largest factories in 1909 and thereafter did not show 
any relationship with electrification. The contrast between these two 
factory sizes is much clearer in Figure 5, ·which shows the relationship 
of a to f3 and y. High correlations are found fo·r the small plants 
while no correlations are found for the large ones. In other words, 
small firms relied much more than large upon electrification for che 
introduction of power, with electricity supplied by public utilities. 
Large firms were able to introduce other power sources directly and 
hence earlier, and could also generate their own electricity. 
15 
B Introduction of motive power and technological progress. 
The impact of motive power on technological progress in smaller 
' 
factories will be demonstrated for two industries: match making and 
weaving. This selection is for two reasons: the production processes 
are relatively easier to be understood and these industries are char­
acterized by small factories. 
Match making industry. Production of matches consists of producing 
matchsticks and boxes, spreading chemicals on the sticks, and putting the 
19
sticks into boxes. With the exception of large manufacturers who carried 
out all of these processes within their plants, firms purchased matchsticks 
and boxes from special producers. Therefore, match making in Japan usually sig­
nified only the second and the third steps, with the arraying of matchsticks 
for spreading chemicals the most important process. This production 
requirement regulated the introduction of machinery and motive power. 
There were three stages in the development of this procedure. 
1. In the beginning boys and girls arrayed matchsticks by hand. 
This system was employed from about 1880 until 1905. 
2. Treadle machines were introduced after 1895, operated by 
female adult workers. 
3. Finally, the German-type machinery, made of iron and run 
mostly by electric motors, was used. This machinery,called doitsu (the 
Japanese word for German), was already kriown in early Meiji and came 
into wide use in late Meiji when Japanese matches began to be exported. 
Usually male adult workers operated this machinery. The productivity of 
labor was several imes greater than using treadle machines. 
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The shift from treadle to German-type machinery was uniquely depen­
dent upon the introduction of prime movers. In 1906 the total capacity 
of prime movers used in the industry was 80 horsepower. More than half 
of this was produced by steam engines; gas and petrol engines were used 
to a lesser extent. By 1914 the total capacity had risen to 335 horsepower, 
with 116 from steam engines. Thereafter, as shown in Table 9, S, 
76 percent, and y, 35 percent, in 1914, increased to 90 and 67 percent, respectively, 
in 1919 and to 97 and 81 percent in 1930. Owing to this rapid introduction of 
electric motors, the percentage of powered factories a, only 26 in 1914, 
increased to 49 in 1919 and to 86 in 1930. 
Let us examine the same thing by scale of factory. In 1914 all 
the largest factories (500-999 persons) were equipped with prime movers. 
On the other hand, none of the smallest factories (5-9 persons) had prime 
movers, and only 6 percent of the second smallest (10-29 persons) 
were so equipped. In these small factories the level increased to about 
80 percent in 1930 through the introduction of electric motors. If these 
factories had run one or two German-type machines (about 2 horsepower) with: 
steam engines, they probably could not have survived the heavy burden of 
capital and operating costs. The Sweden Match Trust, established in 
1921, drove Japanese matches out of foreign markets. Moreover, it 
intended to dominate the market in Japan by founding two companies, 
Daido Match and Asahi Match. This plan was not completely successful, 
in part because of the existence of a number of small scale factories 
(Komiyama 1941, p. 198), whose survival was supported by a decline in nom-
·1nal wages during the depression years of the 1920s (Minami 1973, ch. 7), 
and by the mechanization of production processes during and after World War I. 
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Weaving industry. Japanese weavers were classified into two groups. 
The first group consisted of companies which produced foreign (double) width 
cotton cloth, i.e., the weaving section of cotton spinning companies and a 
small number of companies belonging to the All Japan Cotton Spinner's Associa­
tion. The second group consisted of small-scale factories which produced 
domestic (single) width cloth and silk fabrics. Between these two groups there 
was a difference of timing in the introduction of power looms: whereas they 
were.already in use by 1887 in the first group, in the second group they 
were employed only experimentally after 1897 and only after World War I were 
they used extensively (Sanpei 1961, p. 391). The diffusion of power looms was 
made possible by electrification. As seen in Table 10, the percentage 
of powered factories a, jumped from 38 percent in 1914 to 90 percent 
in 1930, and the use of electric motors increased similarly. Examination 
by scale of factory shows ~ the diffusion 6£ motive power based on 
electrification went on at a higher speed in the smaller scale factories 
belonging to the second group. 
The electrification of smaller-scale weavers was possible because 
of the commencement of service by electric utilities. Three examples 
of the relationship between the start of electric utilities and the 
are given from Sanpei (1961, p. 408).introduction of power looms in these factories 
1. In the case of the weaving industry of Tokamachi, Niigata 
prefecture, electric motors and power looms were introduced in 1924. This 
is attributable to the foundation of the Uonuma Electric Company in 1911. 
2. The introduction of power looms in the Kiryu and Ashikaga dis-
tricts was dependent upon the supply of electric power by the Watarase 
20 
Electric Company established i.n 190ff. 
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3. Weavers in Ichinomiya, Aichi Prefecture, introduced power looms 
relying on cheap electric power purchased from the Ichinomiya Electric 
Company founded in 1923. 
The transition from hand and treadle looms to power looms seems to 
have stimulated labor productivity. Quantitative evidence for this relation 
is found in the Niigata-ken Minami Kanbara Gunze (Economic Survey of Minami 
Kanbara District, Niigata Prefecture) in 1920. This survey shows that 
around 1916 daily production of striped cotton cloth per worker amounted to 
only one tan (about twelve yards) for hand looms and three tan for treadle 
looms, whereas it was nine tan in the case of power looms (Sanpei 1961, p. 407). 
Another survey (Toyo 1950, 2:225) shows while one worker operated only one hand 
loom or treadle loom, he could run. four to twelve power looms or 
forty to sixty automatic looms, clearly displaying the increase in labor 
productivity from the transformation of looms. 
A time-series test for the relationship between the introduction of power 
looms and technical progress is made for the cotton weaving industry. Data is 
available from the Shokosho Tokei-hyo (Statistical Tables of Connnerce and 
Industry) for 1922-38. Denoting the volume of production in physical terms 
(in foreign width cloth equivalent) per production worker, the number of looms 
per worker and the percentage of power looms by p, k and a, respectively, the 
following model is set forth: 
ln pt = a + a1CL + a ln kt+ u a > 0 0 . t 2 t 1 . 
where ln signifies the natural log of a variable. 
19 
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In the case where the number of looms was a good.index of capital stock 
and the ratio of value added to gross output was constant, parameter 
a can be taken as the output (value added) elasticity of capital. Special 
attention must be paid to the second term, a1at, wh
ich corresponds 
to an increase in labor productivity stemming from technological progress 
(defined ·as a shift in the production function). Tnis formulation comes 
from our basic hypothesis that technological progress in this industry 
was dependent largely upon the diffusion of power looms. 
The results of estimation of this equation are given in the upper 
part of Table 11.. Data for 1938 were omitted because p showed an un­
reasonable drop, due perhaps to the dislocation of wartime industrial 
adjustment. The high determination .coefficient suggests the model is 
appropriate for this industry, though there is some serial correlation. 
Parameter a1 
, significant at the conventional significance level, shows 
high sensitivity of labor productivity to the diffusion of power looms. 
Parameter a. suggests the output elasticity of capital was on the order 2 
21
of 0.4-0.5. In the lower part of the table, one may see that, of the 
10.50 percent annual rate pf increase in labor output, 9.8 percentage 
points was attributable to technological progress based on the intro­
duction of power looms, and only 1.31 percentage points to the increase 
in the number of looms per worker. 
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III Electric lighting 
Another aspect of electrification, the diffusion of 
electric lighting, has not been discussed in this paper. In factories, as has 
already been mentioned, electric lighting was introduced much more rapidly 
than electric power. This introduction contributed to the reduction of pro­
duction costs by promoting nightshifts. Before the introduction of electric 
light, petrol lamps were used. Because of the danger of fire from using these 
lamps, however, there was a movement for the abolition of nightshifts (Arisawa 
1959, 1:67). Electrification eliminated this and permitted the widespread 
use of the system. (This gave rise to the widely known tragedy of young 
female workers detailed in Joko Aishi (Miserable History of Female Workers).) 
The rapid diffusion of electric lighting for home use is indicated by 
the number of electric bulbs installed shown in Table 1, column (1). During 
Meiji,traditional lamps such as tomyo (tapers), andon (paper-covered lamps) 
and Japanese candles were gradually being replaced by modern lamps using 
petrol, gas and so forth. Gas lamps were dominant until the late Meiji era, 
but then, owing to a decline in electric lighting rates and the appearance 
of tungsten bulbs, the use of electric lights increased remarkably (Kurihara 
1964, pp. 63-64). Consequently, the number of gas lamps began to decrease 
after a peak in 1917 (Fujino 1965, p~ 444). The substitution of modern 
lamps for traditional lamps and the transition among modern lamps (from 
petrol to gas to electric bulbs) may be explained by differences in economic 
efficiency. Table 12 gives mean candle power, cost per hour and hourly 
cost per candle power, respectively, in columns (1), (2) and (3), for various 
lamps. Mean candle power is very small in the traditional lamps: only 0.25 
for tomyo, 0.2 for andon and 0.5 for a Japanese candle. It is large in the 
modern lamps: 3.2 for petrol, 20.0 for gas and 18.0-30.0 for electric bulbs. 
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Hourly cost per candle power is larger in the traditional, and smaller in 
the modern lamps. Among modern lamps, hourly cost per candle power is 
lowest in electric bulbs (0.021-0.025) and highest in petrol bulbs (0.12). 
Thus, diffusion of electric lighting seems to have had a significant influ­
ence on the daily life of the people. 
IV Conclusions and some implications 
There are five main conclusions from our analysis. 
1. A distinctive characteristic of the revolution in motive power in 
Japan lay in its high speed compared with countries which had developed 
earlier. 
22 During the late 1880s when horsepower of water wheels increased 
rapidly, horsepower of steam engines also showed a big increase. Further­
more, even during the golden age of steam engines, up until the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the introduction of electric motors made rapid 
progress. Consequently, the capacity of electric motors surpassed steam 
engines in 1917 and electrification was eventually completed around 1930. 
In the case of smaller factories, the introduction of electric motors 
proceeded during and after World War I and was almost completed by 1930. 
2. One of the factors responsible for electrification is this form 
of motive power's divisibility into small units. It was due to this 
characteristic that unit drive arrangements replaced group drive arrange­
ments in large scale factories, saving production costs. In smaller 
factories the initial introduction of motive power consisted of instal­
ling small capacity electric motors. Another factor in electrification 
was the externalities from developments in electric utilities and in the 
electrical machine industry. 
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3. The introduction of motive power through the electrification of 
smaller factories enabled labor productivity to increase and gave rise 
to a persistent growth in these factories. As an example, in the match­
making industry~ where smaller factories were dominant, the substitution 
of the German-type machinery for treadle machines was facilitated by the 
introduction of electric motors. This substitution, which raised labor 
productivity, was considered to be one of the main reasons why the smaller 
plants did not disappear in the wake of the Japanese market by the :wed~n 
Match Trust. A second example is the weaving industry. A shift from hand 
and treadle·looms to power looms relied upon electrification and, again, 
increased labor productivity. 
4. The more rapid displacement of steam power by electric power than 
in the case of countries which had developed earlier was largely due to 
' 
the rapid progress of electric utilities. For example, the first supply 
of electricity for public use by the Tokyo Electric Light Company in 
1887 lagged by only five years the establishment of a distribution station 
in New York by the Edison Electric Company. At the beginning of hydro 
generation, a ten year lag existed between the United States and Japan: 
i.e., 1882 for the hydro plant in Appleton, Wisconsin, and 1892 for the 
Keage Hydro Plant in Kyoto. 
The rapid progress of electric utilities in Japan was entirely de­
pendent on borrowed technology. Generation and transmission techniques 
were introduced from abroad, and tools and machinery were all imported. 
Let us take two plants of the Tokyo Electric Light as examples. For the 
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Komabashi Power Plant completed in 1907, water wheels, generators, and 
transformers and distributing boards were imported from Switzerland, 
Germany and the United States, respectively (Arisawa 1960, 6:24-25). Even 
the Inawashiro Hydro Plant in 1914 was equipped almost entirely with imports: 
water wheels from Germany, generators from England, and transformers, trans­
mission towers and insulators from the United States. Electric wires were 
the only_ exception (Hoshino 1964, p. 99). Thus development of electric 
utilities was independent of a domestic electric machine industry for a 
long time. The history of electrification in Japan provides a good example 
of a characteristic inherent in the concept of borrowed technology: vari­
ous kinds of techniques tend to be introduced into less developed countries 
with shorter intervals between techniques relative to the countries devel­
oping these techniques. 
5. Without the introduction of motive power, many of the smaller plants 
would have disappeared during the 1920s, which were depression years in 
Japan. Large factories made some attempts to prevent declining profits 
by introducing new technologies, discharging unskilled workers and so forth. 
On the other hand smaller plants could introduce motive power and raise 
profitability because of the diffusion of cheap electric motors and the big. 
decline in the costs of electric power. Smaller enterprises, like agri­
culture, have been taken as a pool of disguised unemployment. Large number 
of workers discharged from large enterprises during the 1920s were absorbed 
in these enterprises. It appears this absorption would not have been pos~ 
sible without an improvement in technology in the smaller enterprises. 
These suppositions lead to another hypothesis: if the era of steam 
engines had continued for as long as in the earlier developed countries, 
smaller establishments would have been swept away py larger enterprises 
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. h . 23equi pped wit steam engines. That is, the survival of smaller establish-
ments in Japan seems to have been in sOllie part due to the earlier start of 
the age of electric power. The existence of surplus labor has usually been 
pointed out as a basic reason for the dual structure of the economy or the 
coexistence of small scale and large scale enterprises. As an additional 
factor, in the writer's opinion, the very rapid transformation of motive 
power in Japan has to be taken into due consideration. 
24a 
Acknowledgement 
The writer is very much indebted toiOhkawa, Kazushi~ Professor 
Emeritus of Hitotsubashi University for his encouragement in this study. 
Great thanks are also due to Umemura, Mataji also of Hitotsubashi. 
Richard F. Kosobud of the University of Illinois, and to Hugh T. Patrick 
of Yale University for their help in finding relevant literature. 
Grateful acknowledgement is also made to 
I
Kiyokawa, Y~kihiko,of Hitotsubashi, 
for his many comments and to Suzuki, Susumu of the Hitachi Company Ltd. 
for guidance to a history of electric machinery industry. Finally, thanks 
are due to Paul Zimmer for an initial English editing. 
25 
Footnotes 
1 "Motive power" stands for the work done by prime movers which con-
vert the energy of nature directly into the energy of motion. Strictly 
speaking electric motors are not prime move~s in that they consume elec­
tricity generated by other prime movers. In this study, however, they 
are included as prime movers, because, from the standpoint of the user, 
that is what they are (see F~nichel 1966, p. 443). 
2 Regarding the transformation of motive power during and after the 
industrial revolution in western countries, see Landes (1966). For a 
history of the introduction of steam engines and electric motors, see 
Temin (1966) and DuBoff (1967). 
3 For a history of electric generation in Japan see Kurihara (1964) 
and Arisawa (1960, vol. 3). 
4 Continuous statistics for horsepower of electric motors are not 
available prior to 1898. Kanbayashi (1943, p. 300) states the introduc­
tion of electric motors began in the mid-1880s. 
5 The differential in the level of y among factories by size in 1909 
is large compared with the differential in. 8. This is because the 
average horsepower of an electric motor is much smaller than that of a 
steam engine. (Refer to Table 4). 
6 An examination of electrification by industry-group appears worthy 
of further study. A brief reference to this is found in Minami (1965, 
pp. 74-76). 
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The impact of introducing electric motors in large manufacturing7 
plants was different between the two periods. In the first phase, when 
electric power was mostly supplied by the manufacturing factories them­
selves, a substitution of electric motors for steam engines did not 
necessarily mean a saving in capital costs, because these factories 
needed large plants for electric power generation. Savings occurred only 
in fuel consumption because of the greater efficiency of electric motors 
compared to steam engines. According to DuBoff, citing estimates by 
engineers for 1895-97 in the United States, loss of power was cut by 
20 to 70 percent in various circumstances. In the second phase, cheap 
electric power was available from electric utilities. Elimination of the 
need for generation plants in large factories saved capital costs to a 
.An estimate by another engineer shows that by dismantlinggreat extent • 
steam engines and purchasing electric power a firm might cut power costs 
by 70 to 83 percent, taking into accounts expenses for fuel, labor, and 
above all, capital (DuBoff 1967, pp. 510-512)-. 
8 Merits of the unit drive arrangements in the spinning industry have 
been mentioned by many authors, e.g., Arisawa (1960, 7:59), Mariya (1948, 
pp. 80-81, Iijima (1949, pp. 201-202), Nippon Sen-i 1958, p. 788). 
9 Indexes of electric light and power estimated from electric rates 
tables of individual electric utilities are conceptually superior to 
these average rates estimates. However, the reason for not using the 
former is that in the period of over-supply after World War I, electric 
power was sold at much lower rates than those indicated in the rate 
tables, so indexes based on them would probably substantially over-estimate 
the actual rates during this period. 
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Household and industrial use are fairly clearly seperated. Different 
wires were used to deliver electric light and electric power, so even 
small-scale factories were using service provided under the electric power 
rate schedules. 
10 The index for electric power rates estimated by Fujino Shozaburo 
(1956, pp. 66-67 and 1965, Statistical Note IV).did show a decline during 
this period. 
11 Severe competition among electric suppliers was also found in Nagoya. 
Thus, electric rates were much cheaper in Tokyo and Nagoya than other areas. 
This fact may explain a predominance of small-scale enterprises in these 
cities, .as pointed out by Watanabe Tsunehiko at the conference, and leads 
to a hypothesis that geographical differences in the price of electricity 
were related to the geographical distribution of small firms. This hypoth­
esis merits empirical testing. 
12 Of these two over-supply factors, the first seemed to have been 
much more influential. Electric light and power generated, shown in 
Table 1, column (3), continued to increase during the years after the 
war boom. On the other hand,electric generating capacity, shown in 
column (2), increased even faster. Consequently, column (5), the ratio 
of column (2) to column (3) and hence a proxy for the capital-output 
ratio in the electric utilities, increased from 1920 to 1930. This 
ratio changed with changes in economic activity. A study on the capital­
output ratio in the electric utilities has been made in LTES, 12: 81-82. 
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13 Lt· should be ernpJ.iasi~ed t;9ca,t i:hisi: differe:nce, cont;j.nue§ e:v1:n to 
the present day. . There are sever~l fact<;>r§ for this. - '.l'he fir$:t is <:1· 
differeni;e in transmi~s:f.on cost C<>IJlillg from a differen~1: in vqltage. 
(Large users t::ake. hi~h·, volta~es ariq are.;ofteq, closer to t;he · theriµal 
pofer stat~ons.) . '.I'q.e ~eco:nA :f.~. tllc1t lai:-ge c9mpa11.:f.es. of:t::e.n consmne mqst 
:i,.n ~he. ;11tent,f<;>n qt;t,he :·&~nre~~Il; Jq 1;1;1:,~tJ.l~te ind,ll!:>tr:f.,a,.l· deve,lopment • 
. Sue~ ,c:n en,ergy pol~c:r ii:! PO,.~~:f.bl~ l)a5.,:f._~a~ly l>~c,.9:us~ <>f.,th,e 4i.ffere;nce 
in the price elasticity between the electric light and power (§ee)foshino 
et al. 1964, pp. 338-339). 
14 For an estimate of the substitution of eiec;7ri~. J;)p~-1e_:r; .f;qr, coal,, see 
Fujino (1956). 
15 'fhe s:u9s~it111:;f,Q~ of .. ~+eftrf,s, powei::. ~or.~t;e~,pqwer goes. no,t I).ec~ ....;: •· ·.: - ,..: : ..f_ ,,-_·-;.,;-.,... ',·:, .:·.;{.,.;,., ... ; ·•"''•"'· - •••:.,•.•. ' 
es_sar[ly, ntean ~ §up~t;i,~'1tiq1t,JR;- c<>al, ,;if the~l geJ:J,~p:1,t;i?,ll 4~~tand.~ng' .' ·, . . . ; -:. ·., . ;; . . . . '" .. . ; ·' -·' .; ~";. .,.. _.,. , ,•,' ... · .. ·' .. -· .·. - .. ~ { . . . ...· . . . . ; :.:. .. ., ... ,.... ~ . ,\ ... ,' 
further study• 
.,+,6 Th~ .. f1fSt cofP-(ff~I~9'.n c?;}~~~ ~?f.;1~9,9 1?.,~1:v,r~e~.-1:11~ ,To½:ro ~.4ibatira 
Electric and General Electric ,.,?.f the United r-.t.a~e.,.~.': it continues ,tP 
the present. 
17 (H!~a~hi 1949, 2 ~ 118} ~ l'he Tokyo ~J:lib,~ui;a Electric Compa.ny, as 




18 Data for firms with fewer than five production workers are not 
provided in the Kojo Tokei-hyo. A survey in Tokyo City in 1934, however, 
gives some information for this scale. In Table F-1, column (1) the 
percentage of powered factories is tabulated by scale in terms of capital. 
The figures for the average number of employes for respective scales in 
column (2) indicate most of the factories not covered in the Kojo Tokei­
hyo w~re not equipped with any prime movers. Table F-2, calculated from 
I 
the same survey, shows for small factories with fewer than five employes 
having prime movers, the percentages of electric motors a and y were near 
100 percent. 
19 For information on the match making industry this study relies 
heavily on Komiyama (i941). 
20 In the Ashikaga district electric power was introduced during and 
after World War I into small scale home plants. These plants were called 
thereafter doryoku-ya, which signified weaving plants With power looms 
run by electric motors (Sanpei 1961, p. 426). 
21 Kiyokawa Yukihiko (1973) estimates the output elasticity of capital 
as 0.391 in the weaving sector of the cotton spinning companies for 1919-
24. Our result is close to his estimation. 
22 This is stressed by Kanbayashi (1943, p. 300). For instance a 
peak in the percentage of steam engines in the total horsepower in manu­
facturing was reached during almost the same period in both Japan and the 
United States. In Japan, it was in 1890-1905 (Figure 2) and in the 
United States, at the turn of the century (Fenichel 1966, p. 425). 
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23 The impact of electrification on Japan's persistent growth has 
not been properly appreciated, as can be seen from the small amount of 
literature on it. (See Suzuki ; Kogyo 1936, p. 92). 
The fact that the introduction of electric motors increased labor 
productivity can be seen in other countries. According to DuBoff (1967, 
p. 516) for instance, printing and publishing, one of the first major 
industries to be electrified in the United States, was also a leader 
in productivity incr~ases. 
Table F-1: Percentage of powered factories (a) and 
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number of employes by scale of establishment: 
Tokyo City, 1934 
Factory size by Average number 










100;- 499 8.4 2.1 
500- 999 22.7 2.7 
1000- 1999 39.0 3.2 
2000- 4999 54 •.9·· 4.4








500000- 96.1 290.7 
. ·source: Tokyo City 1934. 
...
Col. (1): p. 86; Col. (2): 
pp. 87-88. 
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Table F-2: Percentages of electric motors to total prime movers 







.2 - 4 
105 -
11 - 15 
16 - 30 
31 50 
51 100 
101 - 200 





























· 97.2 . 
99.7 
99.8 
Note: For those factories with any prime movers. 
Source: Tokyo City 1934, pp. ~4-95. 
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Table 1 
Number of electric bulbs ins~alled, electric generating capacity, 
electricity generated and consumed 
Number of Electricity
electric Electric Capacity­
bulbs generating Generated Consumed output
installed capacity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




1905 464 39 
1910 1949 161 '•427 (621) 329 · (523) 377 
1915 7538 . 569 1811 (2217) 1396 (1802) 314 
1920 16138 951 2492815 (4669) 2941 (3795) 
1925 27321 2167 7735 (9093) 5964 (7322) 280 
1930 36840 3961 14034 (15773) 10878 (12618) 282 
1935 43231 . 5137 22155 (24698) 17389 (19932) 232 
1940 54083 7881 30603 (34566) 24614 (28576) 258 
Remarks aSmaller figures are for electric utilities only. Figures including 
industrial plants are shown in parentheses. 
bCol. 5 = [Col. 2] ~ [Col. 3].
Source: 
LTES, vol. 8. Col. (1) from p. 69; col. (2), p. 206; col. (3), p. 196; 
col. (4), P• 198. 
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Table 2 
Composition of prime movers by type and by scale of factory 
in terms of horsepower (in percert:s) 
F::;,c!:or::7 :_::.:.;:;c!:::-ic Steam Gas Petrol :;ate:.: 
size filotori:; engines msines engines wheels 
. (pcr:'>OnGJ .co 
1909 •
Total 13.0 70.0 3.7 2.5 10.7 
5 - 9 10.6 49.6 6.7 12.5 20.6 
10 - 29 9.8 59.7 7.8 9.6 13.2 
30 - 49 7.0 63.4_ 6.o 5.4 18.2 
50 - 99 9.8 76.0 4.2 3.1 6.9 
100 - 499 13.2 64.5 4.o 0.7 17-7 
500 - 999 9.7 ,. 83.7 1.5 o.o 5.0 
1000 - 18.3 78.2 1.4 o.o 2.2 
1914 
Total 30.1 46~8 6.o 1.0 16.0 
5 - 9 27.4 41.8 10.6 6.9 13.2 
10 - 29 26.1 46.3 15.4 4.9 7.2 
30 - 49 20.5 47.2 11.8 1.2 19.3 
5-;) - 99 23.7 4o.o 8.1 1.0 27.2 
100 - 499 26.1 47.2 7.7 0.2 18.8 
500 - 999 33.7 32.8 o.6 0.1 32.9 
.1000 - -36.7. · 6o.1 2.9 o.o 0.2 
1919 
Total 58.5 28.0 4.3 0.5 8.6 
5 - 9 56.9 19.7 6.4 4.4 12.6 
10 - 29 58.7 24.3 9.1 2.6 5.3 
30 - 49 .55.1 34.o 7.3 0.7 3.0 
50 - 99 59.8 30.7 5~2 o.6 . 3.8 
100 - 499 59.3 27.9 3.4 -0.1 9~2 
500.:. 999 69.1 29.3 o.8 0.1 o.8 






Table 2: ·continued 
1930 
Totnl 86.7 11.4 o.6 0~6 0.7 
5 - 9 84.4 6.4 2.1 3.3 3.8 
10 - 29 86.3 9.3 o.8 1.7 2.0 
30 - 49 82.9 13.8 .. 0.7 2.2 o.4 
50 - 99 88.o 9.8 o.4 1.0 o.8 
100 - 499 87.2 11.2 1.0 0.2 o.4 
. 500 - 999 95.8 3.9 o.o 0.1 0.2 
1000 - 8o.4, 18.5 0.1 0.3 0.7 
1'935 
Total . 82.2 15.3 0.7 1.2 b.5 
5 - 9 85.5 4.2 2.5 5.0 2.8 
10 - 29 87.8 6.3 ·. 1.3 3.5 1.0 
30 - 49 87.8 6.9 0.9 3.9 o.6 
50 - 99 90.9 5.6 0.2 3.1 0.3 
100 - 499 8o.4 18.1 o.o 0.9 o.6 
500 - 999 90.3 8.5 o.o 1.1 0.1 
1000 - 78.6 19.7 1.2 0.2· o.4 
1940 • 
Total 81.5 16.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 
5 - 9 89.3 1.0 2.1 4.8 2.8 
10 - 29 92.4 2.7 1.1 2.8 . 1.0 
30 - 49 93.5 3.3 0~6. 2.3 0.3 
50 - 99 94.9 3.3 0.2 1.4 0.2 
100 - 499 84.8 14.o 0.1 0.7 0.3 
500 - 999 86.2 12.1. 0.1 0.2 1.4 
1000 - 74.8 23.6 o.6 0.1 0.9 
Remarks: Excludin~ gas and electric utilities. Steam engines'in this te~le 
include steam turbines. Water wheels are composed of hydro turbines, 
Pelton water wheels and Japanese-type water wheels. Factory (establish:·1e:::i.t) 
size is measured in number of production workers. 





Table 3: Percentage of electric motor.s (y) by scale
 of establishment 
(in percents) 
t . 





Total 19.7 50.8 74.7 94.1 
97.8 
5 ~ 9 17.2 52.1 71.7 91.5
 93.8 95.2 
44.8 69.9 92.4 95·.2 97.210 - . 29 15.2 
98.0
49 10.7 33.3 63.3 91.6 95.
7
;30 -
13.4 34.8 61.8 90.6. 95.9 98.550 - 99 
100 - 499 26.2 49.5 73.5 
94.6 97.4 98.9 
42.3 .70.3 87.7 97.0 98.7 99.6500 - 999 
89.3 94.5 98.6 99.7. 99.81000 - 63.6 
RPrnarks: o= (number of. electric motors/total number of prime. 
movers) x 100. 
Source·:,: Kojo ~okei.:-hyo • 
Tnble 4: · Horsepower -; Per prime mover 
j:,.,_cctric Steam Steam Gas Petrol Water 
liiotors engineG tu.rbines Engines ~gines wheels 
Panel A: • 
Average of· Establishments 
1909 15 35 46 13 5 12 
1914 14 41 84 19 5 35 
1919 19 42 134 28 6 36 
1930 22 44 844 · 38 14 15 
1935 ·9 · 41 1965 76 21 16 
1940 8 64 3888 70 14 41 
Panel B: 
By scale of establishments (1940) 
Number of persons 
5 - 9· 4 17 9 21 8 7 
--
10 - 29 5 30 5 27 11 11 
30 - 49 7 35 150 42 17 16 
50 - 99 8- 26 313 39 20. 21 
100 - 499 11 31 2435 6o :;6. 165 
500 - 999 10 34 2949 94 35 3700 
• 1000 - 7 297 5456 1777 66 2512 
Source .: K;;; Tokci-hy~. 
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Table 5: Average electric light and power rates and coal price index 
Average rate of 
Electric Electric Wholesale price 
Light Power · index of coal 
(1) (2) ( ) 
(yen/1000 K\'/ii) (1934-36 = 1) 
1900 0.34 
1905 85.1a 20.£ o.42 
1910 . 69.4 30.0 o.42 
1915 50.5 30.0 o.44 
1920 t72.4 66.3 1.40 
1925 88.9 .55.6 1.00 
1930 98.8 38.0 o.86 
1935 ·10.5.9 29.4 1.00 
191•0 112.4 · 37~6 1.48 
Remarks: a: data for 1907. 
Sources: Columns (1) and (2) from LTES, 12: 222. 
Column (3) from Arisawa 1960, 3: Appendix Tables pp. 10-11. 
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Table 6: Ratios of electric lighting rate to consumer price index 
and of electric power rate to manufacturing output price index 
Ratio of electric Ratio of electric 
Lighting rate power -r:ate 
a
• ( 1) 
1907 1.30 0.83 
1910 1.14 1.33 
191.5 0.82 1.23 
1920 0.47 1.13 
192.5 0.64 1.27 
1930 0.90 1.30 
19)5 1.00 1.00 
1940 0.83c 0.77 
Remarks: 
aAverage eiec tric lighting rate/consumer pric_e index. 
bAverage electric power rate/manuf'acturing output price ::..nd~~:. 




Electricity rates: Table 5. 
Consu~er price index: LTES, 8: 135-136. 
Manu:facturing output price index: LTES, 8_: 192-19-3-. · 
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Table 7: Price ratio of electric power to coal and labor, and 
the productivity ratio of electric utilities to 
-coal-mining 
Price R.::itio Productivity Ratio 
{1)_a (2) b 
{ 1934 -36 = 1) 
1907 1.56 
1910 2.43 0.22 
1915 2.32 o.4o 
1920 1.61 0.71 
·1925 1.89 0.76 
1930 1 • .50 0.96 
1935 1.00 1.00 · 
1940 o.86 1.33 
Remarks: 
a: Average electric power rate/wholesale price index of coal. 
b: ,k;lectric power generated per employe/ coal produced: per 
employe. 
Sources: 
Electric power rate: Table 5 • 
.l!.'1.ectric power generated per employe' : T..TES, 12: 207. 
Number. of employes in co_al mining .and coal output: 
Arisawa, 1960, 3: Appendix Tables pp. 10-11. 
I 
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Table 8: Percentage of Powered Factories (a) 
by Scale of Establishment 
Nur.1bcr of 
Production 1909 1911• 1919 1930 1935 1940Workers. 
(ncr.sons) 
Total 28.2 45.6 61.1 82.5 86.o 84.1 
• 
14.4 28.5 46.o 76.6 8o.4 78.55 - 9 
10 - 29. 30.1 48.8 65.0 87.2 90.5 88.4 
30 ~ 49 63.7 75.9 85.7 93.8 95.5 95.8 
50 - 99 78.0. 87.7 92.8 97.3 98.0 98.2 
100 - 499 87.1 92.8 97.2 99.1 99,7 99.6 
500 - 999 95.1 96.8 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0 
"1000 - 100.0 97.6 99.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Reoarks: a= (nm::.ber of factories with prime movers/total number of 
factories) x 100. 
Source: LTES, 12: 228-23l_and Kojo Tokei-hy;. 
Table 9: Percentage of Powered Factories (a) and Percentages of Electric Motors Among All Prime 
Movers (p,y) in the Match Making Industry by Scale of Establishment 
(%) 
Number of .. 
Production 
.:.orkers 
1914 1919 1930 
(persons) 
cl. f r ~ 13 ., oL /J r 
· Total 26.2 ?6.1 34.6 49.1 90.2 67.3 86.1 97.2 81.1 
5 - 9 0 - -· 0 - - 80.0 88,2 70.7 
10 - 29 . 5.5 50.0 16.6 23.0 88.8 57.1 78.8 96.0. 81.2 
30 - 49 .17.2 100~0 100.0 30.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.2 95.8 
. 50 - 99 19.4 80.0 69.2 48.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.8 63.7 
100 - 499 . .50.8 7~.o 25.8 83.3. 88.3 67.7 100.0 99.3 98.5 
500 - 999 100.0 83.3 62.5 100.0 86.6 47.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 




Table 10: Percentage of Powered Factories (a) and Percentages of Electric Motors Among Prime 








5 - 9 
10 - 29 
39 - 49 
50 - 99 
·100 - 499 





























































































Sources: Ko jo Tokei-hxo. __ 
... 




Table 11: Estimates of production function and annual rate of growth 
of productivity by components in cotton weaving industry: 1922-37 
(1) Estimates of production functiona 
Parameters 
R2a d 
0 al a2 
-1. 274 0.046 0.457 0.990 0.82 
(5.4) (10.5) (1.6) 
(2) Annual rate of growth of output and its components (in percents) 
G(p) Error 
10.50 9.81 1.31 -0.62 
(100) (93) (13) (-6) 
Remarks: a: The model for estimation is ln p = a + a a + a ln k + u • . · t O 1 t 2 t t 
2R and d stand for the determination coefficient and Durbin-
Watson statistic respectively. Statistics in parenthesis under 
b: 
parameters signify student t-value of the respective parameters. 
G( ) stands for the exponential rate of growth of the variable 
in parenthesis. 
Sources: Data underlying Figure 6. 
Table 12: Mean candle power, cost per hour and hourly cost per candle po
wer of various lamps 
Mean Hourly 
Candle Hourly Cost Per 
Po·,7er -·Cost C.:i.ndle Po·:1er 
{ 1) (2) ('~):(?)/(1) 
(sen) (sen)
Traditional 
;torn1_2 . 0.25 0.5 2.0 
0.2 · 0.5 2.5andon 
0.5 2.5 3.1Japanese candle 
Modern 
\'lestern candle 0.9 0.9 
• 
1.0 
o.6 0.9 1.5lantern (with Western candle) 
0.38 ·0.123.2pet1:'ol lamp (15mm; wick) 
0.093
a,cetylene lar.ip 16.0. 1.5 
20.0 o.6 0.03
gas lamp (rated 20 candle power) 
8.5 0.57· 0.067carbon.. electric bulb (rated.- 10 candle power). . 
18.0 o.45. • 0.025tung~ten electric bulb (rated 24 candle ~ower) 
' . -
30.0 . 0.65 0.021·gas filled electric bulb ( 40'J) . 
Remarks: Figures in 1926 prices. 




Minami figures: Titles and text 
Figure 1: Horsepower of prime movers by type in manufacturing industries 
Remarks: Excludes gas and electric utilities. Figures for 1884-1918 are 
for establishments with ten or more production workers, figures 
for 1919-40 are for establishments with five or more production 
workers. 
Source: LTES, 12: 223. 
Figure 2: Composition of prime movers in terms of ho~sepower 
Source: Same as Figure 1. 
Figure 3: Price of one horsepower electric motors 
Source: Hitachi 1949, 2:118. 
Figure 4: Percentage of powered factories (a) and percentages of electric 
motors (S,y) for the two extreme scales 
Source: Tables 2, 3, 8•. 
Figure 5: Relationship between percentage of powered factories (a) and 
percentages of electric motors (S,y) for two representative scales 
Source: Tables 2, 3, 8. 
/ Figure 1: 46Horse Power of Prime Movers by Tvne in Manufacturing Industries 
--------·------------
s,..,., 
_______, ... · ,._______ 
_;_,..,..-. 
· Jr I · Ill~ ,,,. ,,,, 
Remarks: Excludes gas and electric utilities. Figures for 1884-1918 
are for establishments with ten or more production workers, figures for 1919-
40 are for establishments with five or more production workers. 
Source: Minami 1965, p. 223. 
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Sources: Same as Figure 1. 
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Hitachi Co, Ltd., Hitachi Seisaku-jo Shi (History of Hitach:i),
--~-····-· ·-· --~-Vol. 2, p. 118. 
49 
Figure 4: Percentage of Powered Factories (a.) and·Percentages of Electric 
Motors (S,y) for the Two Extreme Scales 
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Source: Tables 2, 3, 8. 
.,Figure 5: ' Relationship between Pcrcontngc·of Powered Factories 
( c{) o.nd Pcrconta.gea of. Electric 1-totors. ( f , o) for Two 
Rcpr-0sentativo Scales 
5"" 9 person:J 5 ,.__ 9 porsons 
r~- i--, I~it'
30 113.> 
.•.• •,q4c, 30 ,~tol 





1111-Jo .. . 1114J•r • 
)-p 
11 o'J . ~# [ 1'101
• • _,...._.__.._____..____ 
II :u 'J~ . 'Id h /4 !IJ /0 ,, 
• 
J', ~ 1, J-tl 
I ~ 4o ?• /11"" "" '"''j;J3 ' 
1000 persons or more 1000 persons or moro 
1'101t<. 
/tD
ft~ 1q14 1q1f ,,3~ ol to~%~ l'l"1 M14 1'111 11.u--• • • • •• • • • • •• INOIH~ 1115 HJo 
jct " fo 
_.____..__ ...._.__.___ -L-,__..__ ..,_ ___, ,_ 
-L-l----·• -
/() Jo JD {l.tJ t" iJ TO /tJ ft, '() 7IJ ,, JIJ NO /t1 
VI '" I 0 0 
Source: Tables 2·, 3, 8. 
